We study a decentralized matching market in which each rm sequentially makes o ers to potential workers. For each o er, the worker can choose "accept" or "reject, " but the decision is irrevocable. e acceptance of an o er guarantees her job at the rm, but it may also eliminate chances of be er o ers from other rms in the future. We formulate this market as a perfect-information extensive-form game played by the workers. Each instance of this game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), which does not necessarily lead to a stable matching and has some perplexing properties. Our aim is to establish the complexity of computing the SPE, or more precisely, deciding whether each o er is accepted in the SPE. We show that the tractability of this problem drastically changes according to the number of potential o ers related to each rm and worker. If each rm makes o ers to at most two workers (or each worker receives o ers from at most two rms), then the problem is e ciently solved by a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm. In contrast, the problem is PSPACE-hard even if both rms and workers are related to at most three o ers.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a decentralized job market consisting of rms and workers. Each rm has one position to ll and has a preference ordering over potential workers. Additionally, each worker has a preference on positions. To ll a position, each rm rst makes an o er to its favorite worker, and if the o er is rejected, then the next o er is made to the second best worker, and so on.
e o ers of the rms are not synchronized with each other. at is, rms act as if they simulate an asynchronous version of the rm-oriented deferred acceptance algorithm [18, 19] , which is known to nd the position-optimal stable matching just like the original synchronous version [8] . In contrast to these algorithms, in which each worker can keep a tentative contract and decline it when she gets a be er o er, the current market does not allow tentative contracts. Once a worker receives an o er from some rm, she should decide immediately whether to accept or not and cannot change the decision later. us, the acceptance of an o er guarantees her job at that position, but it may also eliminate chances of be er o ers from other rms in the future. It is assumed that the o ers are made in accordance with a prescribed schedule, i.e., there is a linear order on the set of all possible o ers. All the workers know this order, but whether a worker will get each scheduled o er from each rm or not depends on the actions of other workers. us, this market has a sequential structure of decision problems encountered by the strategic workers.
Our model deals with any order of o ers that is consistent with every rm's preference. In particular, we call a market position-ordered if all the o ers by the same rm are successively placed in the order, i.e., there is a linear order on the set of rms according to which each rm makes all its o ers. is case represents, for instance, an academic job market in which di erent positions have di erent hiring seasons. Job-seeking researchers know these seasons, and they can guess each position's preference ordering over the candidate researchers. Once a researcher accepts an o er, she cannot decline it because rescinding a contract unilaterally damages her reputation and adversely a ects her future career. e position-ordered case can also be interpreted as a job market in which institutes have public invitations in di erent seasons and researchers strategically decide whether to apply or not for each invitation.
We formulate this market as a perfect-information extensive-form game among the workers, which we call the sequential matching game (a formal de nition will be given in Section 2.1). Each round of the game corresponds to an o er from a rm. e o ers are made in some xed order. In each round, the worker who receives the o er is the player who takes an action, where the possible actions are ACCEPT and REJECT. If the worker chooses ACCEPT, then the rm and the worker are matched and leave the market, and we move to a subgame in which they are removed. If the worker chooses REJECT, then they stay in the market, and we move to a subgame in which that worker is eliminated from the preference list of the rm. e game ends if there is no rm with a nonempty list. Each strategy pro le uniquely de nes a matching, or an assignment obtained at the end of the game. Each worker's preference over outcome matchings depends only on her own assignment.
is paper investigates a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this sequential matching game, i.e., an action pro le that represents the best actions of the workers in all rounds under the assumption that all the other workers will take their best actions in the future. For every o er, di erent actions result in di erent outcomes for the worker: by rejecting an o er, it is impossible to obtain the same assignment a erwards. Hence, the best action is de ned uniquely at each round by backward induction. erefore, any instance of the sequential matching game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. To clarify the se ing, we provide a small example here.
ere are three research institutes p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 each of which has one position to ll. ree job-seeking researchers q 1 , q 2 , and q 3 are awaiting o ers. e institutes have preferences on acceptable candidates and researchers have preferences on possible institutes as follows.
Each researcher prefers being matched (with an acceptable institute) to being unmatched. e institute p 1 starts scouting rst, and then p 2 and p 3 follow in order. us, the following order is de ned on the o ers.
e o ering order :
where o ers related to previously matched institutes or researchers are skipped. When the rst o er (p 1 , q 1 ) is made, q 1 has two possible actions. If she selects ACCEPT, then she is assigned to p 1 in the outcome matching. If she selects REJECT, she has to anticipate what happens Session 3b: Equilibrium Computation ACM EC'18, June 18-22, 2018, Ithaca, NY, USA. a er the rejection. A er q 1 's rejection, p 1 leaves the market because it has no other candidate. en p 2 makes an o er to q 2 and q 2 may accept or reject. Under the assumption that all workers similarly take the best actions by anticipating other workers' future actions, it is concluded that q 1 would be unmatched in the outcome if she rejects (p 1 , q 1 ). us, ACCEPT is her best action in the rst round.
In this manner, we can de ne the best action for each round. Fig. 1 shows all possible rounds, and red edges represent the best actions. e SPE of this instance then results in an assignment that matches pairs
Note that this does not coincide with a unique stable matching {(p 1 , q 1 ), (p 2 , q 2 ), (p 3 , q 3 )} of this preference pro le.
Recently, the sequential matching game has been studied actively under various se ings. In many of those se ings, it has been shown that the SPE leads to the proposed-side optimal stable matching.
is fact implies that each player can e ciently compute her best strategy by just computing the optimal stable matching. However, such a characterization of the SPE does not hold in our se ing. Indeed, the outcome matching of the above example is unstable. Furthermore, unlike many other models, the SPE outcome changes drastically depending on the order of o ers in our model. ese distinctive features indicate the di culty in capturing SPEs in our model.
In this paper, we consider the complexity of computing an SPE. Note that representing an SPE itself obviously requires exponential time since the tree representation has exponential size. erefore, it is more reasonable to consider the following decision problem: given an instance and a history (a possible sequence of actions), decide whether the next player selects ACCEPT in the SPE. Note that each subgame of a given instance is again a sequential matching game instance. en, we would rather consider the following equivalent problem.
Problem 1.2 (SPEM)
. Given an instance of the sequential matching game, decide whether the rst o ered worker selects ACCEPT or not in the SPE.
We call this decision problem SPEM. Note that the outcome matching of the SPE, which we call the SPE matching, can be obtained by solving SPEM repeatedly. Conversely, SPEM is solved if we can compute the SPE matching. We classify subclasses of SPEM by the maximum length of the preference lists of rms and workers. For positive integers s and t, the problem (s, t)-SPEM is the restriction of SPEM in which the preference list of each rm and worker has at most s and t entries, respectively. Moreover, (s, ∞)-SPEM and (∞, t)-SPEM denote the restrictions in which only one side has a limitation on the list length.
Contributions is paper provides the following dichotomy theorem that completely characterizes the computational complexity of (s, t)-SPEM for all s and t. T 1.3. e problem (s, t)-SPEM can be solved in polynomial time if s ≤ 2 or t ≤ 2. Otherwise, it is NP-hard, and furthermore PSPACE-hard.
For the above theorem, we show the tractability of (2, ∞)-SPEM and (∞, 2)-SPEM in Section 3 and the PSPACE-completeness of (3, 3)-SPEM in Section 4.
We will rst show that both (2, ∞)-SPEM and (∞, 2)-SPEM are in the complexity class P by providing an e cient algorithm to compute the SPE matching. As we have observed in the above example, the SPE matching of an (∞, 2)-SPEM instance is not necessarily stable. However, fortunately, we can compute it by a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, which we call the sequentially xing deferred acceptance algorithm (SFDA). is algorithm repeatedly computes the worker optimal stable matching and removes the matched pair that appears rst in the o ering order. e correctness of SFDA implies that, whenever a worker receives an o er from some rm, her best action is ACCEPT if and only if she is assigned to that rm in the worker-optimal stable matching of the "current" subgame, rather than of the original instance. SFDA also works for (2, ∞)-SPEM, i.e., it outputs the SPE matching. Furthermore, we can show that for (2, ∞)-SPEM, the output of SFDA coincides with the worker-optimal stable matching independently of the o ering order. Hence, for (2, ∞)-SPEM, the SPE matching is exactly the worker-optimal stable matching.
In contrast to the above tractable cases, the problem (3, 3)-SPEM is far from tractable. Actually, it is PSPACE-complete, which means that there exists no polynomial-time algorithm to solve it unless P=PSPACE.
As we will see in Section 2.3, the sequential matching game has strange but interesting properties. First, as shown in Example 2.5 (Section 2.1), the SPE matching may di er according to o ering orders, and hence the set of SPE matchings for the same preference pro le with di erent o ering orders may contain multiple matchings. Furthermore, these matchings do not satisfy a "rural hospital theorem"-like property, i.e., the set of matched positions and workers in the SPE matching may di er among these matchings. Moreover, the SPE matching is unstable in not only the standard sense but also some stronger senses such as vNM-stability [7] and essential stability [14] . us, SPE matchings for the general SPEM seem inexplicable by existing notions, while the above tractable cases can be clearly explained by the well-known stability notions.
Related Work e complexity of nding a Nash equilibrium in normal form games has been well studied in the context of algorithmic game theory [20] . However, li le work has been done on a subgame perfect equilibrium in extensive-form games. It is known that computing an SPE is PSPACE-complete for the sequential versions of unrelated machine scheduling, congestion games [16] , and cost sharing games [4] .
In the context of economics, the outcomes generated by decentralized matching markets have been studied under various conditions [1-3, 11, 21, 23, 24] . Most existing studies have analyzed when a decentralized market will yield a stable matching. [11] considered a similar se ing to ours: in each stage, each rm o ers a position to a worker, and then each worker irrevocably chooses whether to accept one of the received o ers or to reject all of them. Roughly speaking, their game is based on a synchronous version of deferred acceptance algorithm, while our game is based on an asynchronous version. ey claimed that, when workers sequentially decide their actions in each Session 3b: Equilibrium Computation ACM EC'18, June 18-22, 2018, Ithaca, NY, USA.
stage, every SPE results in the worker-optimal stable matching [11, eorem 2] , but this claim has been proven not true in the present study (see Remark 2.6 for details).
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Model
In this section, we give a formal de nition of the sequential matching game. e sequential matching game is played by a sequential process of acceptance/rejection for o ers in a stable matching instance, which is formulated as a perfect-information extensive-form game.
A matching instance is a tuple I = (P, Q, E, ), where each component is de ned as follows. ere are a nite set of rms P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } and a nite set of workers Q = {q 1 , . . . , q m }. Each rm has one position, and we o en identify each rm with its position. e set of acceptable pairs is denoted by E ⊆ P × Q. For e = (p, q) ∈ E, let us denote ∂ P (e) p and ∂ Q (e) q. For each rm p ∈ P and each worker q ∈ Q, the acceptable partner sets are denoted by Γ I (p) {q ∈ Q | (p, q) ∈ E} and by Γ I (q) {p ∈ P | (p, q) ∈ E}, respectively. e set of acceptable pairs that contain p ∈ P and q ∈ Q are denoted by δ I (p) {e ∈ E | ∂ P (e) = p} and δ I (q) {e ∈ E | ∂ Q (e) = q}, respectively. ere is a strict ordinal preference r for each r ∈ P ∪ Q over Γ I (r ), and denotes the pro le ( r ) r ∈P ∪Q . We sometimes write q p q to denote (p, q) p (p, q ) for p ∈ P.
A mapping µ : P ∪ Q → P ∪ Q is called a matching in I = (P, Q, E, ) if µ(r ) ∈ Γ I (r ) ∪ {r } and µ(µ(r )) = r for every r ∈ P ∪ Q. A rm or worker r ∈ P ∪ Q is said to be matched to µ(r ) if µ(r ) r , and to be unmatched if µ(r ) = r . For each r ∈ P ∪ Q and two matchings µ 1 and µ 2 , we write µ 1 r µ 2 if µ 1 (r ) r µ 2 (r ), where we suppose that r is virtually added to the bo om of the preference r over Γ I (r ) (i.e., each r prefers to be matched to an acceptable partner rather than to be unmatched). A matching µ in I is o en referred to as the corresponding set of acceptable pairs
A sequential matching game is de ned by a pair of a matching instance I = (P, Q, E, ) and an order σ over E, which is a bijection from {1, . . . , |E|} to E. We assume that σ is consistent with ( p ) p ∈P , i.e., if σ (i), σ (j) ∈ δ I (p) and i < j then σ (i) p σ (j). We say that σ (or the game (I , σ )) is position-ordered if all the pairs relevant to the same rm appear in a row, i.e., for every p ∈ P and every i, j, and k with i ≤ j ≤ k and
We introduce two fundamental operations on a sequential matching game. For a set X and an element e ∈ X , we simply denote X \ {e} by X − e.
De nition 2.1 (Deletion). For a matching instance I = (P, Q, E, ) and a pair e ∈ E, the deletion of e from I is de ned as I \e (P, Q, E − e, ), where r is the preference over Γ I \e (r ) that is consistent with r for each r ∈ P ∪ Q, i.e., s r t if and only if s r t for every s, t ∈ Γ I \e (r ). For an order σ over E, the deletion of e from σ is an order σ \e over E − e that is consistent with σ , i.e., (σ \e) −1 (e 1 ) < (σ \e) −1 (e 2 ) if and only if σ −1 (e 1 ) < σ −1 (e 2 ) for every e 1 , e 2 ∈ E − e.
De nition 2.2 (Contraction).
For a matching instance I = (P, Q, E, ) and a pair e = (p, q) ∈ E, the contraction of I by e = (p, q) is de ned as I /e (P −p, Q −q, E/e, ), where E/e E\(δ I (p)∪δ I (q)), and r is the preference over Γ I /e (r ) that is consistent with r for each r ∈ (P − p) ∪ (Q − q). For an order σ over E, the contraction of σ by e is an order σ /e over E/e that is consistent to σ . O 2.3. Deletion and contraction are commutative. at is, for any two disjoint pairs e 1 , e 2 ∈ E, we have (I /e 1 )\e 2 = (I \e 2 )/e 1 .
Let e = (p, q) ∈ E. For a matching µ in I /e, µ + e denotes the matching µ in I such that µ(p) = q, µ(q) = p, and µ(r ) = µ (r ) for every r ∈ (P − p) ∪ (Q − q). Conversely, for a matching µ in I with µ(p) = q and µ(q) = p, µ − e denotes the matching µ in I /e such that µ (r ) = µ(r ) for every r ∈ (P − p) ∪ (Q − q). e game (I , σ ) is recursively de ned as follows. Let σ (1) = e = (p, q). In the rst round, p o ers to q, and q chooses ACCEPT or REJECT for the o er. If q chooses ACCEPT, then p and q are matched irrevocably, and then (I /e, σ /e) is played (i.e., the outcome is µ + e for some matching µ in I /e). If q chooses REJECT, then p and q are unmatched irrevocably, and then (I \e, σ \e) is played (i.e., the outcome is some matching in I \e). As we have already seen in Fig. 1 , this process can be represented by a rooted tree, where the root corresponds to the rst round of the game (I , σ ), and each node (except the leaves) corresponds to a game (I , σ ) and has two children corresponding to the two subgames (I /σ (1), σ /σ (1)) and (I \σ (1), σ \σ (1)). We call this tree the tree representation of the game (I , σ ).
We consider a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the sequential matching game. A strategy pro le is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium of every subgame of the original game. In every round of the game, the two actions ACCEPT and REJECT for an o er (p, q) result in di erent outcome matchings, say µ 1 and µ 2 , respectively. One of them is preferred to the other by the worker q, because µ 1 (q) = p µ 2 (q). Hence, the optimal strategy is uniquely de ned in each subgame by backward induction, and every game admits a unique SPE. e outcome matching according to the SPE of a game (I , σ ) is called the SPE matching of (I , σ ), which is denoted by SPE(I , σ ). e next property immediately follows from the above de nitions.
Example 2.5. Let us formulate Example 1.1 as a sequential matching game (I , σ ) with I = (P, Q, E, ).
e rm set is P = {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 } and the worker set is Q = {q 1 , q 2 , q 3 }. e set of acceptable pairs is
e preferences are the same, i.e., p 1 :
We can also see that σ is induced by a rm order π :
As seen in Example 1.1 (see the tree representation in Fig. 1 ), the SPE matching is
Let us examine whether that di erent order of o ers result in di erent SPE matchings even if the matching instance is exactly same. Consider the above instance I , and let σ be an order over E such that
Note that this σ is also position-ordered (induced by a rm order π with (π (1), π (2), π (3)) = (p 2 , p 3 , p 1 )). e tree representation of (I , σ ) is shown in Fig. 2 , and the SPE matching is
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The tree representation of (I, σ ). The bold red edges indicate SPE.
For any sequential matching game, a unique SPE can be computed by the backward induction algorithm. However, the algorithm requires exponential time because the tree representation has exponential size.
In this paper, we consider the decision problem of whether ∂ Q (σ (1)) selects ACCEPT in the rst round. We call this problem SPEM as de ned in Problem 1.2. e restriction of SPEM in which the numbers of acceptable partners of each rm and of each worker are at most s and t, respectively, is denoted by (s, t)-SPEM. Remark 2.6. In [11] , similar sequential matching games were considered, and there are several di erences between their models and ours. e most similar se ing was studied in [11, Section 4] , where the only di erence is that, a er all rms have o ered (where each rm o ers to the most preferred worker among the workers to whom it has never o ered), the workers choose their actions (either to accept exactly one o er and reject the rest or to reject all o ers) sequentially in a prespeci ed order.
Let us consider the matching instance I in Example 2.5. In the rst stage, each rm p i o ers to q i (i = 1, 2, 3). Suppose the rst decision-maker is q 1 . If q 1 rejects p 1 's o er, then q 2 and q 3 should accept the o ers they received because, otherwise, they will be unmatched. In this case, q 1 will be unmatched (no other rm will o er to q 1 ), and hence q 1 should conclude to accept p 1 's o er.
en, q 2 and q 3 can reject the o ers from p 2 and p 3 , respectively, and they subsequently receive o ers from p 3 and p 2 , which are, respectively, their preferred rms, in the second stage. us the SPE of this game yields a matching {(p 1 , q 1 ), (p 2 , q 3 ), (p 3 , q 2 )}, which is the same as SPE(I , σ ) in Example 2.5.
[11, eorem 2] claimed that such a game enjoys a unique SPE, and it results in the workeroptimal stable matching (which is formally de ned in the next section). However, this claim is not true, as evidenced by the above example, in which the worker-optimal stable matching in I is {(p 1 , q 1 ), (p 2 , q 2 ), (p 3 , q 3 )}.
Stability and Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
In this section, we brie y overview the stability and deferred acceptance algorithm (see [10, 15, 17, 22] for more details).
Let I = (P, Q, E, ) be a matching instance, and M be the set of all matchings in I .
De nition 2.7 (Stability [8] ). For a matching µ ∈ M, an acceptable pair e = (p, q) ∈ E is called a blocking pair if q p µ(p) and p q µ(q) (where recall that each r ∈ P ∪ Q is regarded as the bo om of the preference r ). A matching µ ∈ M is said to be stable if there exists no blocking pair for µ.
e sets of matched workers and rms are invariant across all stable matchings.
T 2.8 ([18]).
If there exists a stable matching in I under which r ∈ P ∪ Q is matched (resp., unmatched), then r is matched (resp., unmatched) under every stable matching in I .
A many-to-one generalization of this theorem is well known as the rural hospital theorem. For distinct µ, µ ∈ M, we de ne µ Q µ if µ(q) q µ (q) (∀q ∈ Q). It is easy to observe that Q is a partial order over M. A maximal (minimal) element with respect to this partial order is unique.
De nition 2.9 (Optimality [15] (a ributed to J. H. Conway)).
e set of all stable matchings in I forms a distributive la ice with respect to the partial order Q . A unique maximal element in this distributive la ice is said to be worker-optimal or Q-optimal, and denoted by QOPT(I ). at is, QOPT(I )(q) q µ(q) for any stable matching µ in I and any worker q ∈ Q.
e worker-optimal stable matching can be computed by Algorithm 1. rough the algorithm, the proposal with respect to each pair e = (p, q) ∈ E and its rejection occur at most once in Lines 4 and 7, respectively, and the number of comparisons with respect to p in Line 6 is equal to the number of workers rejected by p in Line 7. Hence, the algorithm requires O(|E|) time in total.
Algorithm 1: Q-oriented DA [8] input : A matching instance I = (P, Q, E, ) output : e Q-optimal stable matching QOPT(I )
1 SetÎ ← I and µ(r ) ← r for each r ∈ P ∪ Q; 2 while ∃q ∈ Q such that µ(q) = q and Γ I (q) ∅ do 3 for each q ∈ Q such that µ(q) = q and ΓÎ (q) ∅ do 4 Set to µ(q) the most preferred rm in ΓÎ (q) (q proposes to µ(q) ∈ P); 5 for each p ∈ P such that ∃q ∈ Q with µ(q) = p do 6 Set to µ(p) the most preferred worker in {q ∈ Q | µ(q) = p} (among the workers who propose to p); 7 µ(q) ← q andÎ ←Î \(p, q) for each q ∈ Q such that µ(q) = p and µ(p) q (p irrevocably rejects q's proposal);
We here show several properties on the worker-optimal stable matchings, which will be utilized in Section 3. C 2.10. If q is on the top of p's list, then QOPT(I )(q) q p.
P . Suppose to the contrary that QOPT(I )(q) ≺ q p. We then have QOPT(I )(p) ≺ p q as QOPT(I )(p) q, and hence (p, q) is a blocking pair, contradicting the stability of QOPT(I ). C 2.11. For e = (p, q) ∈ E, if QOPT(I )(q) = p, then QOPT(I )(q) q QOPT(I \e)(q).
P . Suppose to the contrary that QOPT(I \e)(q) q QOPT(I )(q) = p. Since QOPT(I \e) is a stable matching in I \e, any e ∈ E − e is not a blocking pair. en, QOPT(I \e) is also a stable matching in I , because e cannot be a blocking pair (due to QOPT(I \e)(q) q p). is contradicts the Q-optimality of QOPT(I ).
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P . Let µ QOPT(I ) − e. Since QOPT(I ) is stable in I , there is no pair e = (p , q ) ∈ E/e such that q p µ(p ) and p q µ(q ), which implies that µ is stable in I /e. By Q-optimality, we have QOPT(I /e) Q −q µ, and hence QOPT(I /e) + (p, q) Q µ + (p, q) = QOPT(I ). C 2.13. For e = (p, q) ∈ E, if QOPT(I )(q) q p, then QOPT(I ) = QOPT(I \e).
P . Since QOPT(I ) is stable in I \e, we have QOPT(I ) Q QOPT(I \e) by Q-optimality. en, p ≺ q QOPT(I )(q) q QOPT(I \e)(q), and hence e = (p, q) cannot be a blocking pair for QOPT(I \e).
us QOPT(I \e) is also stable in I , and hence QOPT(I ) Q QOPT(I \e) by Q-optimality.
We also consider another (weaker) concept of stability. For µ, µ ∈ M, we say that µ dominates µ if there exists a pair (p, q) ∈ E such that (i) p q µ (q) and q p µ (p), and (ii) µ(p) = q.
De nition 2.14 (von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stability [7] ). A nonempty set of matchings V ⊆ M is called vNM-stable set if it satis es the following two properties: (internal stability) any µ ∈ V does not dominate another µ ∈ V ; (external stability) any µ ∈ M \ V is dominated by some µ ∈ V . It is known that V is uniquely determined [7, 26] . We say that µ ∈ M is a vNM-stable matching or satis es vNM-stability if µ ∈ V . e vNM-stable set also forms a distributive la ice, which includes all stable matchings. Hence, the worker-optimal vNM-stable matching is de ned, and is a Pareto-e cient matching for the workers which all workers weakly prefer over the worker-optimal stable matching.
Basic Observations
In this section, we provide some basic properties of the sequential matching game. is section can be skipped if the reader is only interested in our main results.
We rst observe that top-top pairs are matched in the SPE matching. P 2.15. For a sequential matching game (I , σ ), let e = (p, q) be an acceptable pair such that each of them is the most preferred partner of the other. en, SPE(I , σ ) = SPE(I /e, σ /e) + (p, q).
P
. We prove the proposition by induction on σ −1 (e). For the base case σ −1 (e) = 1, the worker q selects ACCEPT because p is the best position for her. Hence SPE(I , σ ) = SPE(I /e, σ /e) + (p, q). Suppose that σ −1 (e) > 1. Let σ (1) = e = (p , q ). Note that p p since q is most preferred by p. By induction and Proposition 2.4, we have (i) SPE(I , σ ) = SPE(I \e , σ \e ) = SPE((I \e )/e, (σ \e )/e) + (p, q) = SPE(I /e, σ /e) + (p, q) if SPE(I \e , σ \e )(q ) q p and (ii) SPE(I , σ ) = SPE(I /e , σ /e ) + (p , q ) = SPE(I /e /e, σ /e /e) + (p , q ) + (p, q) = SPE(I /e, σ /e) + (p, q) if SPE(I \e , σ \e )(q ) ≺ q p . Hence, the proposition holds.
is proposition implies that, if an instance of the game satis es the Eeckhout condition 1 , the SPE matching coincides with the unique stable matching.
Next, we see that an SPE matching may have a blocking pair but it only admits a certain type. P 2.16. For a sequential matching game (I , σ ), let µ be the SPE matching. en q p µ(p) and p q µ(p) hold only if σ −1 ((p, q)) > σ −1 ((µ(q), q)). 1 e Eeckhout condition is a su cient condition for the existence of a unique stable matching. We say that a matching instance I = (P, Q, E, ) satis es the Eeckhout condition if it is possible to rearrange rms and workers so that (i) for any rm p i ∈ P , q i p i q j for all j > i; (ii) for any worker q i ∈ Q , p i q i p j for all j > i [6] .
Session 3b: Equilibrium Computation
ACM EC'18, June 18-22, 2018, Ithaca, NY, USA.
P
. We prove the proposition by contradiction. Suppose that q p µ(p), p q µ(p), and σ −1 ((p, q)) < σ −1 ((µ(q), q)). Let us consider the subgame (I , σ ) that is reached in the SPE where σ (1) = (p, q) . Here, the subgame (I , σ ) exists because p and q are not matched by q p µ(p) and σ −1 ((p, q)) < σ −1 ((µ(q), q) ). e optimal strategy of q at (I , σ ) is ACCEPT since p q µ(p); however, q selects REJECT in the SPE, which is a contradiction.
Finally, we present two strange properties of the sequential matching game. e former shows that the game does not satisfy a "rural hospital theorem"-like property, and the la er shows that the SPE matchings may be unstable in not only the standard sense but also stronger senses. See the full version [12] for the detail, which includes speci c examples to show them. P 2.17. ere exists a matching instance such that the set of matched rms and workers in the SPE matching changes according to the order of o ers. P 2.18. ere is an SPE matching that is neither vNM-stable nor essentially stable.
ALGORITHM FOR TRACTABLE CASES
As one side of our main dichotomy result eorem 1.3, we show the following theorem. Recall that (2, ∞)-SPEM (resp., (∞, 2)-SPEM) is the restriction of SPEM in which the length of each rm's (resp., worker's) preference list is at most two. Note that, for an instance (I , σ ), we can solve SPEM e ciently if we can compute SPE(I , σ ) e ciently, because whether ∂ P (σ (1)) selects ACCEPT at the rst round or not corresponds to whether σ (1) ∈ SPE(I, σ ) holds or not. erefore, to show eorem 3.1, it su ces to prove the following theorem, which is the purpose of this section. We show eorem 3.2 in the following way. In Section 3.1, we introduce an e cient algorithm, which we call the (Q-oriented) sequentially xing deferred acceptance algorithm (SFDA) and provide its properties. en, Section 3.2 shows that the output of SFDA for (I, σ ) coincides with SPE(I , σ ) if (I , σ ) is a (2, ∞)-or (∞, 2)-SPEM instance.
Sequentially Fixing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
is section introduces the (Q-oriented) sequentially xing deferred acceptance algorithm (SFDA), which is sketched as follows: given an instance (I , σ ), the algorithm repeatedly computes the Q-optimal stable matching and updates the instance by removing the rm-worker pair that appears rst in the o ering order among all the matched pairs. e algorithm stops the repetition when there is no acceptable pair, and then outputs the matching that consists of all the pairs removed so far. We denote the output matching by SFDA(I , σ ). e formal description of SFDA is given in Algorithm 2. Recall that QOPT(I ) in the description denotes the Q-optimal stable matching of a matching instance I .
It is worth mentioning that the algorithm SFDA is closely related to the (Q-oriented) e ciency adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm (EADA), which is introduced by [13] and simpli ed by [5] and [25] . EADA iteratively xes a last proposer 2 under DA while SFDA xes the minimum pair in the predetermined order σ . EADA produces the worker-optimal vNM-stable matching, and hence SFDA also produces it if the order σ is consistent with the xing order in EADA.
Algorithm 2: Q-oriented SFDA input : An instance (I , σ ), where I = (P, Q, E, ) output : A matching SFDA(I, σ )
1 Set (Î ,σ ) ← (I , σ ) and let µ(r ) ← r for every r ∈ P ∪ Q; 2 while there is some acceptable pair inÎ do 3 Let e = (p, q) be the pair that minimizes σ −1 (e) subject to e ∈ QOPT(Î );
For any instance (I, σ ) of the sequential matching game, SFDA(I , σ ) has the following properties.
P . We use induction on subgames. Let e = (p, q) be the rst pair chosen at Line 3 of SFDA. By the algorithm, SFDA(I, σ ) = SFDA(I /e, σ /e) + (p, q). Since SFDA(I /e, σ /e) Q QOPT(I /e) by induction, then SFDA(I , σ ) = SFDA(I /e, σ /e) + (p, q) Q QOPT(I /e) + (p, q) Q QOPT(I ), where the last relation follows from Claim 2.12.
P
. By the algorithm, (b) is clear: since e = (p, q) = σ (1), the condition QOPT(I )(q) = p means that e is the rst pair chosen at Line 3, and hence SFDA(I , σ ) = SFDA(I /e, σ /e) + (p, q).
We show (a) by induction on subgames. Since e = (p, q) = σ (1), Claim 2.10 and QOPT(I )(q) p imply QOPT(I )(q) q p.
en Claim 2.13 implies QOPT(I ) = QOPT(I \e). Let e * = (p * , q * ) be the rst pair chosen at Line 3. As QOPT(I ) = QOPT(I \e), SFDA also chooses e * when the input is (I \e, σ \e). By the algorithm, SFDA(I , σ ) = SFDA(I /e * , σ /e * ) + (p * , q * ) and SFDA(I \e, σ \e) = SFDA((I \e)/e * , (σ \e)/e * ) + (p * , q * ) = SFDA((I /e * )\e, (σ /e * )\e) + (p * , q * ). Note that Claim 2.12 implies QOPT(I /e * )(q) q QOPT(I )(q) q p, and hence SFDA(I /e * , σ /e * ) = SFDA((I /e * )\e, (σ /e * )\e) by induction. us, we obtain SFDA(I , σ ) = SFDA(I \e, σ \e).
e output of SFDA depends on the order σ , i.e., we may have SFDA(I , σ ) SFDA(I, σ ) if σ σ . However, the set of rms and workers matched in SFDA(I , σ ) coincides with that of QOPT(I ) independently from σ , i.e., the following claim holds. C 3.5. For any r ∈ P ∪ Q, we have SFDA(I , σ )(r ) = r if and only if QOPT(I )(r ) = r . P . We use induction on subgames. Let e = (p, q) be the rst pair chosen at Line 3 of SFDA. Clearly, p and q are matched in both SFDA(I , σ ) and QOPT(I ). For each r ∈ (P − p) ∪ (Q − q), we have SFDA(I , σ )(r ) = SFDA(I /e, σ /e)(r ) by the algorithm. Also, by the induction, we have SFDA(I /e, σ /e)(r ) = r if and only if QOPT(I /e)(r ) = r . Note that QOPT(I ) − (p, q) is a stable matching in I /e by the de nition of the stability. en eorem 2.8 implies that, for each r ∈ (P − p) ∪ (Q − q), QOPT(I /e)(r ) = r if and only if QOPT(I )(r ) = r . Combining these, we obtain that, for every r ∈ P ∪ Q, we have SFDA(I , σ )(r ) = r if and only if QOPT(I )(r ) = r .
Finally we analyze the time complexity of SFDA. e algorithm repeats nding the Q-optimal stable matching of each updated instance, which requires O(|E|) as mentioned in Section 2.2.
Because one pair is xed at each iteration stage, the number of iteration is at most min{|P |, |Q |}. us, the algorithm SFDA runs in O(|E| · min{|P |, |Q |}). C 3.6. e matching SFDA(I , σ ) can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof of the Tractability
is part is devoted to show the following theorem, which completes the proof of eorem 3.2, and hence of eorem 3.1.
We prove eorem 3.7 by induction on subgames linking Claim 3.4 and Proposition 2.4, the inductive properties of SFDA(I, σ ) and SPE(I , σ ), respectively. For this purpose, we provide the following special properties of (2, ∞)-and (∞, 2)-SPEM instances.
P . We use induction on subgames. Let e = (p, q) = σ (1). ere are two cases. If QOPT(I )(q) p, then Claim 3.4 (a) implies SFDA(I, σ ) = SFDA(I \e, σ \e) and Claims 2.10 and 2.13 imply QOPT(I ) = QOPT(I \e). Since QOPT(I \e) = SFDA(I \e, σ \e) by induction, we obtain QOPT(I ) = SFDA(I , σ ).
If QOPT(I )(q) = p, then Claim 3.4 (b) implies SFDA(I , σ ) = SFDA(I /e, σ /e) + (p, q), which equals QOPT(I /e) + (p, q) by induction. en it su ces to show QOPT(I ) = QOPT(I /e) + (p, q). Suppose, to the contrary, this equality fails. As we have QOPT(I /e) + (p, q) Q QOPT(I ) by Claim 2.12, the Q-optimality of QOPT(I ) implies that µ QOPT(I /e) + (p, q) is unstable in I , i.e., there is (p , q ) ∈ E with q p µ(p ) and p q µ(q ). Since QOPT(I /e) is stable in I /e, we have (p , q )
E/e E\(δ I (p) ∪ δ I (q)). Hence, p = p or q = q holds. If p = p, then q p µ(p) = q = QOPT(I )(p) and p q µ(q ) q QOPT(I )(q ), and hence (p, q ) blocks QOPT(I ), a contradiction. erefore, we have q = q and p p, from which q p µ(p ) and p q µ(q) = p = QOPT(I )(q) follow. Since QOPT(I ) is not blocked by (p , q ) (= (p , q)), the la er condition implies QOPT(I )(p ) p q. As we have QOPT(I )(p ) QOPT(I )(p) = q, we obtain QOPT(I )(p ) p q p µ(p ). Note that both QOPT(I ) − (p, q) and µ − (p, q) are stable in I /e. By eorem 2.8, QOPT(I )(p ) p implies µ(p ) p . us, QOPT(I )(p ), q, µ(p ) ∈ Q are three di erent entries of the preference list of p , which contradicts the fact that the list of p has at most 2 entries. C 3.9. For any (2, ∞)-or (∞, 2)-SPEM instance (I, σ ) and any e = (p, q) ∈ E, the condition QOPT(I )(q) = p implies p q SFDA(I \e, σ \e)(q).
P
. In the case of (2, ∞)-SPEM, the subgame (I \e, σ \e) is also a (2, ∞)-SPEM instance, and hence QOPT(I \e) = SFDA(I \e, σ \e) by Claim 3.8. en p q QOPT(I \e)(q) = SFDA(I \e, σ \e)(q) follows from Claim 2.11.
In the case of (∞, 2)-SPEM, since q's preference list is of length at most 2, p is on the top or the bo om of the list. If p is on the top, clearly p q SFDA(I \e, σ \e)(q). If p is on the bo om, by Claim 2.11, p = QOPT(I )(q) q QOPT(I \e)(q) = q. By Claim 3.5, this implies SFDA(I \e, σ \e)(q) = q.
us, we have p= SFDA(I \e, σ \e)(q).
Now we are ready to show eorem 3.7, which states that the output of SFDA coincides with the SPE matching for a (2, ∞)-or (∞, 2)-SPEM instance. P T 3.7. We show SFDA(I , σ ) = SPE(I, σ ) by induction on subgames. Let e = (p, q) = σ (1). Note that for a (2, ∞)-SPEM (resp., (∞, 2)-SPEM) instance (I , σ ), the subgames (I \e, σ \e) Session 3b: Equilibrium Computation ACM EC '18, June 18-22, 2018 , Ithaca, NY, USA.
and (I /e, σ /e) are also (2, ∞)-SPEM (resp., (∞, 2)-SPEM) instances. erefore, by induction we have SFDA(I /e, σ /e) = SPE(I /e, σ /e) and SFDA(I \e, σ \e) = SPE(I \e, σ \e). We consider two cases: QOPT(I )(q) p and QOPT(I )(q) = p. In the case QOPT(I )(q) p, Claims 2.10 and 3.3 imply SFDA(I, σ )(q) q QOPT(I )(q) q p. Also, Claim 3.4 (a) implies SFDA(I , σ ) = SFDA(I \e, σ \e) = SPE(I \e, σ \e). en SPE(I \e, σ \e)(q) q p. By Proposition 2.4 (a), SPE(I , σ ) = SPE(I \e, σ \e) = SFDA(I , σ ).
In the case QOPT(I )(q) = p, Claim 3.4 (b) implies SFDA(I , σ ) = SFDA(I /e, σ /e) + (p, q) = SPE(I /e, σ /e) + (p, q). Since (I /e, σ /e) is a (2, ∞)-or (∞, 2)-SPEM instance, by Claims 3.9, we have p q SFDA(I \e, σ \e)(q) = SPE(I \e, σ \e)(q). By Proposition 2.4 (b), then SPE(I , σ ) = SPE(I /e, σ /e)+ (p, q) = SFDA(I , σ ).
In particular, for (2, ∞)-SPEM, combining eorem 3.7 and Claim 3.8 gives the following corollary. anks to eorem 3.7, for any (2, ∞)-SPEM or (∞, 2)-SPEM instance, we can compute the SPE matching of a given instance by the algorithm SFDA. (In particular, for (2, ∞)-SPEM, we can compute it by DA by Corollary 3.10.) Because SFDA runs in polynomial time as shown in Claim 3.6, eorem 3.7 immediately implies eorem 3.2. en eorem 3.1 also follows.
HARDNESS OF THE SPEM PROBLEM
In this section, we show PSPACE-completeness of computing the SPE for the sequential matching problem even if the length of each rm's and worker's preference list is at most three and the ordering is restricted to position-ordered. Formally, we prove the following theorem. First of all, we can solve SPEM in polynomial space by implementing backward induction as a depth-rst search of the game tree. us, the problem is in class PSPACE.
In what follows, we prove the hardness by giving a reduction from QUANTIFIED 3SAT, which is a PSPACE-hard problem [9] . Let V = { 1 , . . . , n } be the set of variables and (Q 1 1 )(Q 2 2 ) · · · (Q n n ) φ( 1 , . . . , n ) be a quanti ed Boolean formula. Here, Q i is either ∀ or ∃ for i = 1, . . . , n and φ( 1 , . . . , n ) is a Boolean expression in 3-CNF. QUANTIFIED 3SAT asks whether the given quantied Boolean formula is true or not. Let ∃ = {i | Q i = ∃} and ∀ = {i | Q i = ∀}.
In our reduction, we create a position-ordered (3, 3)-SPEM instance (I , σ ) with I = (P, Q, E, ≺) that consists of three phases-assignment, evaluation, and output-as shown in Fig. 3 .
In the assignment phase, for each Boolean variable i ∈ V , we create two workers x i and x i , whose actions correspond to an assignment of T or F to i . Each x i has exactly two acceptable rms s i and t i with t i x i s i . Suppose that x i is the best and the worst choice for s i and t i , respectively. us, x i must be matched at least to s i in the SPE matching SPE(I , σ ). In addition, suppose that the best choice forx i is s i and the second choice for s i isx i . en, in the SPE matching SPE(I , σ ),x i matches to s i if x i does not match to s i .
Let π be the position order that induces σ , such that it starts with s 1 , . . . , s n and ends with t 1 , . . . , t n . Let a i ∈ {T , F } for each i = 1, . . . , n. For each 0 ≤ k ≤ n, let us denote by (I , σ ) [a 1 , ...,a k ] the subgame of (I , σ ) just a er s 1 , . . . , s k have nished their o ers in which, for each i = 1, . . . , k, the contraction of (s i , x i ) has occurred (i.e., x i has accepted s i 's o er) if a i = T and the contraction of (s i ,x i ) has occurred (i.e., x i has rejected s i 's o er and thenx i has accepted) if a i = F . Note that the subgames (I , σ ) [a 1 , ...,a n ] correspond to the assignments to the variables 1 , . . . , n in a one-to-one manner.
In the evaluation phase, for each Boolean variable i ∈ V , we create a rm r i and a worker z i with (r i , z i ) ∈ E. We will design the evaluation phase so that it correctly evaluate the value of φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) for every assignment (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ {T , F } n by the SPE of the corresponding subgame (I , σ ) [a 1 , ...,a n ] . Formally, we prove the following claim. C 4.2. One can design the evaluation phase in Fig. 3 so that, for any assignment (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ {T , F } n with the corresponding subgame (I , σ ) (I , σ ) [a 1 , ...,a n ] , the following holds:
(i) for any i ∈ ∃ , we have (r i , z i ) ∈ SPE(I , σ ) ⇐⇒ φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) = T , and (ii) for any i ∈ ∀ , we have (r i , z i ) ∈ SPE(I , σ ) ⇐⇒ φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) = F .
We postpone proving Claim 4.2, and suppose that we use the evaluation phase designed so. e following claim shows whether each worker x i should accept s i 's o er or not. en, in the corresponding subgame (I , σ ) (I , σ ) [a 1 , ...,a i −1 ] , (i) if i ∈ ∃ , we have (s i ,x i ) ∈ SPE(I , σ ) ⇐⇒ φ = T , and (ii) if i ∈ ∀ , we have (s i ,x i ) ∈ SPE(I , σ ) ⇐⇒ φ = F .
P . We prove this by backward induction on i. e base case i = n holds by Claim 4.2 because x n will be o ered from t n ( x n s n ) if and only if (Q n , φ ) = (∃, T ) or (∀, F ). For a given 1 ≤ i < n, suppose that the claim holds for j ≥ i + 1. By the induction hypothesis and Claim 4.2, if x i rejects s i 's o er (note that thenx i must accept s i 's o er), then x i will be o ered from t i ( x i s i ) if and only if (Q i , φ ) = (∃, T ) or (∀, F ). us, the claim holds.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that Q 1 = ∃ and 1 does not appear in the 3-CNF. en, x 1 rejects s 1 's o er in the SPE if and only if the given QUANTIFIED 3SAT is an yes-instance. Hence, deciding whether the rst edge σ (1) = (s 1 , x 1 ) is accepted in the SPE of (I , σ ) is PSPACE-complete. . . , C m } be the set of clauses for the given 3-CNF. For each clause C j ∈ C, let C j = j,1 ∨ j,2 ∨ j,3 such that j,k ∈ {x λ(j,k ) ,x λ(j,k ) } (k = 1, 2, 3). Also, let N + = {(j, k) | j,k = x λ(j,k) , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}} and N − = {(j, k) | j,k =x λ(j,k ) , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}}. Without loss of generality, we may assume that λ(j, 1) < λ(j, 2) < λ(j, 3). We construct a (3, 3)-SPEM instance (I , σ ) as follows. In the instance, we use OR u for u ∈ U OR m j=1 {(j, 1), (j, 2)}, AND u for u ∈ U AND {1, . . . , m}, NOT u for u ∈ U NOT N − ∪ ∃ , and BRANCHING u for u ∈ U BRANCHING m−1 j=1 { (1, j) , . . . , (n, j)} ∪ {1, . . . , n − 1}. e set of rms and workers are respectively de ned as P {s 1 , . . . , s n , t 1 , . . . , t n , r 1 , . . . , r n ,ĉ 1 , . . . ,ĉ m } ∪ e input and output of each gadget are given as shown in Table 1 . [12] . erefore, we conclude that the constructed evaluation phase satis es the desired condition.
us we have completed the proof of eorem 4.1.
